... papers and positions them in relation to prior research and ongoing discussions in the field. Drawing on the “three-legged stool” model that captures the relationships between performance measurement system, incentives, and organizational structure/corporate governance, we suggest potential research...

... the grant date fair value when participating in corporate governance. We find that CEO equity compensation expense, a distinct measure of equity compensation, is a determinant of shareholder voting for management sponsored equity plans and voting for directors that serve on the compensation committee. After...

...Kendall O. Bowlin; Margaret H. Christ; Jeremy B. Griffin ABSTRACT Say-on-pay is a corporate governance mechanism through which investors cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The Dodd-Frank Act mandates say-on-pay for U.S. firms. Congress is currently considering changes...

... of turnover in the subsequent period. compensation consultant consulting fee executive compensation corporate governance Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has long been a subject of interest among regulators, market participants, and researchers, with numerous studies examining...

...Brian J. Bushee; Mary Ellen Carter; Joseph Gerakos ABSTRACT We examine institutional investors' preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. We find little evidence of an association between total institutional ownership and governance mechanisms. However, using revealed preferences, we...

... advanced to explain the effects of corporate governance arrangements on CEO compensation: optimal contracting ( Jensen and Murphy 1990 ; Murphy 1999 ), and managerial power ( Bebchuk and Fried 2003 , 2004 ). Optimal contracting theory views CEO compensation contracts as a remedy to agency problems (e.g...

... Bushee for generously supplying data related to institutional holdings. 2013 compensation contracting monitoring forward-looking information corporate governance Second, using our short-horizon proxy, we document further empirical support for the theory that forward-looking...

... with higher CEO pay efficiency when I control for the effects of firm size, growth opportunity, firm risk, and corporate governance. The results are similar even when I use nominal or realized CEO pay to calculate the CEO pay efficiency. Overall, the results suggest that interests of CEOs and shareholders...

...George C. Drymiotes ABSTRACT Recent corporate governance failures have prompted regulators and legislators to introduce new rules and legislation aimed at improving corporate governance. In this paper, I highlight a potential unintended consequence of such actions by showing that increasing...