ABSTRACT
This study examines the effects of reciprocity, self-awareness, and social value orientation on honesty in managerial reporting. I measure each manager's social value orientation personality characteristic and conduct an experimental study that manipulates two contextual factors: a hiring choice and a signature requirement. I find that managers are not homogeneous in their reporting decisions. Pro-socials provide more honest reports when they are required to sign the budget report or when they are endogenously hired. Pro-selfs provide more honest reports when they are endogenously hired, and the level of honesty incrementally increases when pro-selfs sign the budget report. I find no support for the signature requirement alone increasing the level of honesty exhibited by pro-selfs. The differences in intrinsic preferences between SVO types exposed to situational cues common in a participative budget setting have the potential to inform employee recruitment and selection by organizations to allow for efficient budgetary control.
