This study investigates the effects of cross- and stable shareholdings on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit in Japan. Cross- and stable shareholdings are well-known features of Japanese corporate governance, as a private information-sharing system. The results indicate that the trade credit of customers without either cross- or stable shareholdings increases with accounting quality, and in most cases, such shareholdings weaken the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit. These findings suggest that close ties to cross- and stable shareholders reduce the importance of accounting information through sharing private information. The findings will enhance the understanding of ownership structure’s potential impact. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the role of accounting quality in financing and the factors that reduce this role. In addition, this study highlights policy implications for the regulatory initiatives to unwind cross-shareholdings, which may affect private information sharing.

Data Availability: Data are available from sources indicated in the text.

JEL Classifications: G34; M41.

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