We predict and find that regulations expected to harmonize and strengthen firms' financial reporting in the European Union (EU) in the early 2000s increase Tobin's Q ratios of firms with high agency costs due to (1) concentration of control (entrenchment) and (2) an excess of the largest shareholder's voting rights over cash flow rights. These results are consistent with stronger reporting standards enhancing firm value by mitigating incentives for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Increases in Tobin's Q associated with financial reporting reform are concentrated in EU firms that (1) are not cross‐listed in the U.S., (2) have families as their largest shareholders, or (3) have a largest shareholder who holds 20 percent or more of the firm's cash flow rights. These results suggest that minority shareholders of firms with the most severe perceived information asymmetries are among the major beneficiaries of EU financial reporting reform.
