This study investigates whether investor protection affects the efficient communication of private information about future prospects through income smoothing. While prior research suggests that the level of earnings management differs between high and low investor protection countries, we examine whether the underlying motive for earnings management differs between high and low investor protection countries. Using firm‐level data from 44 countries for 1993 to 2002 and Tucker and Zarowin's (2006) method to measure earnings informativeness, we find that earnings informativeness is more positively associated with income smoothing in countries with strong investor protection than it is in countries with weak investor protection. Our findings suggest that managers in weak investor protection countries are more likely to use income smoothing for opportunistic reasons while managers in strong investor protection countries are more likely to use income smoothing to convey their private information about future earnings. The results are robust through various additional analyses. More broadly, our results suggest that the role of accounting discretion is affected by a country's institutional infrastructure, specifically, its ability to provide protection for outside shareholders.
