ABSTRACT
This paper provides evidence on how the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) generates accounting standards in the presence of lobbyists with differing preferences. I develop hypotheses regarding the associations between attributes of lobbyists and their lobbying activity, and their lobbying success. I find that lobbying success is positively related to the ability of the lobbyist to provide information to the IASB; however, this success is dependent on the credibility of the lobbyist. I also find evidence that lobbying success is associated with the impact that the lobbyists have on the viability of the IASB, measured by their financial contributions and the size of the capital market in their home country. However, this association is not present when I look only at cases where lobbyists disagree with IASB proposal drafts. This evidence is useful in evaluating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent considerations regarding the adoption of IFRS by the U.S., as well as the recent change in the structure of the IASB that requires a defined geographic mix of board members by the year 2012.
Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the paper.