ABSTRACT
This study investigates the interplay of management and the audit committee on auditor judgments and evidence documentation. In a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, 58 experienced auditors were tasked with evaluating an inventory obsolescence issue when management's incentives to influence the auditor were either higher or lower. The auditors were also either provided or not provided with additional communicated expectations from the audit committee that opposed management's aggressive reporting preference. Drawing on research on competing preferences and source credibility theory, we predict and find that when management's incentives are higher, additional audit committee communication has a significant and positive impact on auditors' evidence evaluation and related judgments. However, we find no effect of added audit committee influence when management incentives are lower. These findings highlight the importance of examining the interrelationships among the various actors contributing to corporate governance and also inform standard setters about the benefits of increased communication between audit committees and auditors.
