ABSTRACT:
The current study experimentally examines effort expectations (i.e., planned hours) for a manager made by participants in the role of the manager or the manager's superior. The experiment also manipulates the type of incentive system (i.e., bonus based on either strategic or all measures) and the type of performance measure (i.e., strategic or general). We predict and find that the participants in the manager role engage in self-enhancement (e.g., Pfeffer and Fong 2005; Sedikides and Gregg 2008). Specifically, the total hours that managers planned to work were more than the total hours their superiors expected the manager to work. We also find that both the type of incentive system and the type of performance measure moderate managers' tendency to engage in self-enhancement. Compared to a strategic incentive system, managers' self-enhancement was diminished under a comprehensive incentive system. Further, participants in the manager role engage in self-enhancement for planned strategic hours but not for planned general hours.
Data Availability: Available upon request.
