We investigate the effects of auditor-wrongdoer reputations for performance and likeability on fellow auditors' intentions to take action in response to a questionable audit act. We also use this context to explore auditor selection of reporting outlets, when they do choose to take action. In an experiment with 181 auditors, main effects suggest that likeability reputation is a significant determinant of intention to take action, while performance reputation is marginally significant. As expected, interaction results indicate that auditors have the greatest intention to take action against less likeable, poor performers. Contrary to expectations, intention to take action against a more likeable, good performer is no lower than the mixed conditions. Thus, the influence of the two dimensions of reputation is complex. Additionally, we find auditors are more likely to whistle-blow internally than externally, and through non-anonymous outlets than anonymous outlets. Our contributions include exploring the impact of reputation on the actions of third parties, and advancing prior literature by considering the influence of wrongdoer attributes on reporting decisions and auditors' reporting channel preferences.

Data Availability: Data are available from the first author upon request.

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