ABSTRACT
Political Action Committees (PACs) affiliated with large accounting firms allow these firms to develop political connections by facilitating contributions to specific candidates, campaigns, and parties. Individuals in the profession may also make such contributions, outside of the PACs, although their motivations for giving are relatively unknown. This study examines political contributions by accounting-related PACs and contributions from individuals within the accounting profession. We find that accounting PACs are largely funded by influential firm members (i.e., partners) and support powerful legislators with probusiness ideologies. We fail to find that contributions from individuals in the profession favor probusiness legislators. Further, contributions directly from firm employees largely come from nonpartners and marginally favor legislators with procivil rights ideologies. Overall, our findings indicate that accounting firms’ strategic political contributions may align with their private business interests but may not serve the public interest and may differ from the larger professional accounting community.
Data Availability: The data used in this manuscript are publicly available.
