Little research has been done concerning the disclosure of animal testing in annual reports. We posit that companies receive pressure from two groups to disclose animal testing practices: social/political activists and financial intermediaries (fund managers). We describe a legitimization framework culminating in corporate social disclosures on animal testing in annual reports and we use legitimacy theory to inform our empirical investigation of animal testing disclosures. The results reveal a significant increase in number and intensity of disclosures over the period considered. These disclosures also reflect a change in the nature of the underlying firm behavior in a manner consistent with legitimacy theory and predictions of our legitimization framework. We find that political/social activists appear to be more effective in their legitimizer role than financial intermediaries. Further, exploratory analyses reveal that some socially‐responsible mutual fund managers invested in companies that perform animal testing, despite it allegedly being a screening criterion. In light of these findings, we suggest ways in which animal rights organizations could advocate to further improve corporate behavior with regard to animal testing.
Skip Nav Destination
Article navigation
1 December 2007
Research Article|
January 01 2007
Animal Testing and Legitimization: Evidence of Social Investment and Corporate Disclosure Available to Purchase
Arline Savage;
Arline Savage
California Polytechnic State University.
Search for other works by this author on:
Joseph H. Callaghan
Joseph H. Callaghan
Oakland University.
Search for other works by this author on:
American Accounting Association
2007
Accounting and the Public Interest (2007) 7 (1): 93–123.
Citation
Arline Savage, Joseph H. Callaghan; Animal Testing and Legitimization: Evidence of Social Investment and Corporate Disclosure. Accounting and the Public Interest 1 December 2007; 7 (1): 93–123. https://doi.org/10.2308/api.2007.7.1.93
Download citation file:
Pay-Per-View Access
$25.00