Do Banks Audited by Specialists Engage in Less Real Activities Management? Evidence from Repurchase Agreements | Citedby Results | AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory | American Accounting Association

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Do Banks Audited by Specialists Engage in Less Real Activities Management? Evidence from Repurchase Agreements

AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory (2019) 38 (1): 149–169.

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