This study examines how the appointment of an audit committee (AC) member as the lead independent director (AC_LID) is associated with AC oversight quality. On one hand, this designation can elevate AC prominence and authority on the board and improve AC oversight quality. On the other hand, appointing an AC_LID may overburden the AC member and compromise oversight quality. Consistent with the enhanced AC authority argument, we find that the presence of an AC_LID is positively associated with oversight quality, but only when AC personal power is weak. The impact of AC_LID on oversight quality is not due to the personal power effect, the accounting expertise effect, or the executive compensation effect. Only AC_LIDs who are not overburdened exhibit a beneficial effect, and their connections with CEOs do not compromise oversight quality.

Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

JEL Classifications: M49; G30.

Keywords:
lead independent director, audit committee, organizational source of authority, oversight quality, financial misreporting
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2025