Underlying attributes of reduced audit quality (RAQ) acts are investigated in this research paper. Since RAQ acts may result from ethical judgments, we examine whether they could vary because of differences in moral intensity. Moral intensity was proposed by Jones (1991) in a model that looked at the attributes of the moral issue itself. This study examines whether auditors perceive seven different RAQ acts to differ on three components of Jones' model (social consensus, magnitude of consequences, and probability of effect). Little variation was found on the social consensus dimension showing that auditors think the acts equally wrong. However, significant differences in perceptions about the RAQ acts relating to the probability of effect and the magnitude of consequences were found. The results suggest that RAQ acts differ in terms of their moral intensity, and hence auditors' decisions to undertake RAQ behavior may be issue‐contingent. The study provides empirical support for Jones' model by showing, in an audit context, that moral intensity factors vary with the moral issue.
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1 May 2008
Research Article|
May 01 2008
The Moral Intensity of Reduced Audit Quality Acts
Paul Coram;
Paul Coram
aSenior Lecturer at the University of Melbourne.
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Alma Glavovic;
Alma Glavovic
bQualified Accountant at Adamson & Cross Chartered Accountants.
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Juliana Ng;
Juliana Ng
cAssociate Professor at the Australian National University.
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David R. Woodliff
David R. Woodliff
dAssociate Professor at the University of Western Australia.
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Online ISSN: 1558-7991
Print ISSN: 0278-0380
American Accounting Association
2008
AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory (2008) 27 (1): 127–149.
Citation
Paul Coram, Alma Glavovic, Juliana Ng, David R. Woodliff; The Moral Intensity of Reduced Audit Quality Acts. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 1 May 2008; 27 (1): 127–149. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2008.27.1.127
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