This study investigates factors indicating CFO intentions of fraudulent financial reporting. Structural equation modeling is used to analyze survey data obtained from 139 CFOs. We find that an extended reasoned action model fits the data well and explains CFO intentions to report fraudulently. More specifically, we find that CFOs of large companies are more likely to report fraudulently in the financial statements and that compensation structure is not a good indicator of CFO intentions to report fraudulently. Informal and formal audit methods for assessing management attitudes toward fraudulent reporting, such as questionnaires and automated decision aids, are recommended since they offer the best opportunity to improve significantly auditors' ability to predict fraudulent financial reporting. Implications for future research and practice development are considered.
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1 May 2005
Research Article|
May 01 2005
CFO Intentions of Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Peter R. Gillett, Associate Professor;
Peter R. Gillett, Associate Professor
aThe State University of New Jersey.
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Nancy Uddin, Assistant Professor
Nancy Uddin, Assistant Professor
bMonmouth University.
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Online ISSN: 1558-7991
Print ISSN: 0278-0380
American Accounting Association
2005
AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory (2005) 24 (1): 55–75.
Citation
Peter R. Gillett, Nancy Uddin; CFO Intentions of Fraudulent Financial Reporting. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 1 May 2005; 24 (1): 55–75. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2005.24.1.55
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