This research examines the individual and interactive effects of client retention incentive and client business risks on auditors' decisions regarding whether to accept clients' aggressive reporting practices. Fifty‐five audit seniors and managers from all of the Big 5 accounting firms participated in this experimental study. We find a significant main effect of client business risks and an interactive effect between client retention incentives and client business risks on auditors' decisions. Specifically, the results indicate that, when a client's business risks are high, auditors tend to scrutinize such risks and carefully evaluate a client's proposed accounting practices. However, when there is less concern over a client's business risks, auditors may be willing to accept the client's aggressive reporting proposal if retention incentives are high.
The Impact of Retention Incentives and Client Business Risks on Auditors' Decisions Involving Aggressive Reporting Practices
C. Janie Chang, Nen‐Chen Hwang; The Impact of Retention Incentives and Client Business Risks on Auditors' Decisions Involving Aggressive Reporting Practices. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 1 September 2003; 22 (2): 207–218. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2003.22.2.207
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