This study examines the impact of the pressure to obtain potential client business opportunities on auditor judgments. Thirty‐two lower rank auditors (staff and seniors) and 39 higher rank auditors (managers and partners) were either provided or not provided with information on additional client business opportunities when assessing a client's potential inventory obsolescence risk. Lower rank auditors judged the obsolescence risk to be lower when provided with information on additional business opportunities than when such information was not provided. In contrast, there were no differences in the judgments of higher rank auditors when either provided or not provided with such information. These findings suggest that, through greater tacit management skills and exposure to other counter‐pressures such as litigation and risk‐management concerns, higher rank auditors are better able to manage competing goals and recognize the importance of freedom from client pressure than are lower rank auditors. Implications for training procedures and audit judgment research are discussed.

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