... is that the likelihood of disclosure is inverse-U shaped in investor attention. For low levels of attention, more attention facilitates communication and increases disclosure; for high levels of attention, more attention better identifies, and therefore deters, unfavorable voluntary disclosures. We provide empirical...

...Florin Şabac; Jie (Joyce) Tian ABSTRACT We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for communication of private, unverifiable managerial information to be valuable for stewardship purposes. First, the hard, verifiable information must be able to confirm to some extent the truthfulness...

... 2014 2015 principal-agent theory asymmetric information communication information sharing An important consideration in the design of accounting information systems is to whom access should be given ( Feltham and Hofmann 2012 ; Demski, Lewis...

... standards or investor protection laws relative to the U.S. Further corroborating our results, we also find that these communication efforts are partially successful. Within a country, firms that produce relatively more readable disclosures attract relatively more U.S. institutional ownership. Collectively...