Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia

We thank Vikas Agarwal, Sanjeev Bhojraj, Robert Bloomfield, Qi Chen, Mark L. DeFond (editor), Alex Edmans, Vivian Fang, Frank Gigler, Paul Healy, Chandra Kanodia, Christian Leuz, Haresh Sapra, Nemit Shroff, Rodrigo Verdi, Charles Wang, two anonymous referees, and workshop participants at Cornell University, Duke University, 2014 ESADE-IESE Business School-Universitat Pompeu Fabra Joint Seminar (Barcelona), George Mason University, 2016 Harvard University Business School IMO Conference, IE Business School, INSEAD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Minnesota, Nazarbayev University, The Ohio State University, Temple University, and WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management for helpful comments and suggestions. We acknowledge financial support from the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Cass Business School, City University London.

This paper was previously circulated under the title “Real Effects of Frequent Financial Reporting.”

Supplemental material can be accessed by clicking the link in Appendix A.

Editor's note: Accepted by Mark L. DeFond.