Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency‐Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia (Retracted)

We examine the effects of increased capital market pressure and disclosure frequency‐induced earnings/cash flow conflict on myopic behavior. In our experiments, experienced financial managers choose between projects where a conflict exists between near‐term earnings and total cash flow. Managers more often choose projects that they believe will maximize short‐term earnings (and price) as opposed to total cash flows in response to increased capital market pressure resulting from a pending stock issuance, holding constant agency frictions and other stock market pressures. When faced with increased capital market pressure, changes in disclosure frequency cause managers to behave more or less myopically depending on the impact of the change on the pattern of earnings and the resulting earnings/cash flow conflict. Our study provides insights into managers' beliefs about stock market pressures, mandatory reporting, and the availability of alternative communications channels, and contributes to literature on managerial myopia and earnings management, as well as current debates over disclosure frequency.