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Journal Articles
Accounting Horizons (2022) 36 (4): 261–264.
Published: 01 December 2022
Journal Articles
Accounting Horizons (2022) 36 (4): i–xi.
Published: 01 December 2022
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Effect of Cybersecurity on Accounting Information: <em>Event, Impact, a</em>...
Published: 01 December 2022
FIGURE 1 Effect of Cybersecurity on Accounting Information: Event, Impact, and Response Framework More
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Panel B: Case Two (<em>Clocks</em>)  The dependent variable is <ita
Published: 01 December 2022
Panel B: Case Two (Clocks) The dependent variable is Accede for each of the two cases, which is the mean response to the question: “In your opinion, what is the likelihood that someone in [the hypothetical senior auditor]'s position would accede to this suggestion?” Responses were recorded on a percentage likelihood scale with endpoints of 0 and 100, with higher scores indicating greater likelihood of unethical behavioral intentions. 1 reflects the CONTROL TREATMENT and 2 reflects the EXPOSED TREATMENT—the two experimental conditions in which we manipulate the timing (with respect to the accede decision) of exposure to seven exogenously provided rationalizations. Additionally, Influence reflects a participant's tendency toward finding the provided rationalizations influential. We partitioned the sample, by case, into two groups based on participants' factor scores for Influence, whereby Low (High) Influence reflects the subsample of participants with a factor score less than or equal to (greater than) the sample median. More
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Task Performance in Production Period<sup>a</sup> by Expected Monitoring Co...
Published: 01 December 2022
FIGURE 1 Task Performance in Production Perioda by Expected Monitoring Conditionb and by Level of Psychological Entitlementc Figure 1 shows the interactive effect of psychological entitlement and the expectation of being monitored on performance in the production period. In the Low-Monitoring condition, higher feelings of psychological entitlement lead to lower performance while in the High-Monitoring condition, higher feelings of psychological entitlement lead to higher performance. a This variable represents the number of mazes completed correctly by the participant in the production period. b We manipulated this variable such that in the Low-Monitoring condition there is no explicit expectation of ex post performance verification while in the High-Monitoring condition there is explicit expectation of ex post performance verification. c This represents a dichotomous split (at the median of 29) of the continuous measured variable for psychological entitlement using Campbell et al.'s (2004) Psychological Entitlement Scale. More
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Misreporting<sup>a</sup> in Production Period by Expected Monitoring Condit...
Published: 01 December 2022
FIGURE 2 Misreportinga in Production Period by Expected Monitoring Conditionb and by Level of Psychological Entitlementc Figure 2 shows the interactive effect of psychological entitlement and the expectation of being monitored on misreporting in the production period. In the Low-Monitoring condition, higher feelings of psychological entitlement lead to lower performance while in the High-Monitoring condition, higher feelings of psychological entitlement lead to higher performance. a This variable represents the number of mazes reported as correctly competed less the number of mazes actually completed correctly by the participant in the production period. b We manipulated this variable such that in the Low-Monitoring condition there is no explicit expectation of ex post performance verification while in the High-Monitoring condition there is explicit expectation of ex post performance verification. c This represents a dichotomous split (at the median of 29) of the continuous measured variable for psychological entitlement using Campbell et al.'s (2004) Psychological Entitlement Scale. More
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Use of Obstacle Strategy in Production Period<sup>a</sup> by Expected Monit...
Published: 01 December 2022
FIGURE 4 Use of Obstacle Strategy in Production Perioda by Expected Monitoring Conditionb and by Level of Psychological Entitlementc Figure 4 shows the interactive effect that psychological entitlement and the expectation of being monitored on the usage of a potentially questionable, though beneficial performance strategy (i.e., the obstacle strategy). Individuals in the High-Monitoring condition with high feelings of psychological entitlement used this performance strategy less than individuals in the other conditions. a This variable represents the number of mazes completed through an obstacle divided by the number of mazes where such a strategy was possible given the participant's position in the maze packet. b We manipulated this variable such that in the Low-Monitoring condition there is no explicit expectation of ex post performance verification while in the High-Monitoring condition there is explicit expectation of ex post performance verification. c This represents a dichotomous split (at the median of 29) of the continuous measured variable for psychological entitlement using Campbell et al.'s (2004) Psychological Entitlement Scale. More
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