Why Do Firms Utilize the Flexibility Allowed in CEO-Employee Pay Ratio Disclosure? Evidence from Dodd-Frank Act Section 953 (b) | Citedby Results | Accounting Horizons | American Accounting Association

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Why Do Firms Utilize the Flexibility Allowed in CEO-Employee Pay Ratio Disclosure? Evidence from Dodd-Frank Act Section 953 (b)

Accounting Horizons (2021) 35 (2): 83–106.

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