Do Auditors Tolerate Management’s Attempt to Meet Earnings Targets? Evidence from Executive Stock Option Plans in China Free

We thank the two anonymous reviewers and Jagan Krishnan (editor) for their helpful comments. Yuanyuan Cao, Songsheng Chen, and Wenying Li are grateful for research funding provided by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project Numbers 72102017; 72102146; 71972011; and 72472102). Jun Guo acknowledges the summer research grant from Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, School of Business. Wenying Li and Songsheng Chen are the corresponding authors.

We wish to honor the memory of John Daniel Eshleman, who passed away in March 2022.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect any position of the National Natural Science Foundation of China.

^* Deceased.

Yuanyuan Cao, Beijing Institute of Petrochemical Technology, School of Economics and Management, Department of Accounting, Beijing, China; Songsheng Chen, Beijing Institute of Technology, School of Management, Department of Accounting, Beijing, China; Jun Guo, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, School of Business, Accounting Department, Camden, NJ, USA; Wenying Li, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, School of Accounting, Department of Auditing, Shanghai, China; John Daniel Eshleman, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, School of Business, Accounting Department, Camden, NJ, USA.

Editor’s note: Accepted by Jagan Krishnan, under the Senior Editorship of Gopal V. Krishnan.