This paper presents preliminary evidence of the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the quantity and quality of firm‐specific information released to the market by comparing analyst forecast data from pre‐FD to post‐FD time periods. By prohibiting selective disclosure of material information to privileged individuals, the Securities and Exchange Commission intends to provide a level playing field to all investors. However, opponents argue that FD has a negative impact by decreasing the quantity and quality of publicly available information. Consistent with this argument, we document a decrease in analyst following and an increase in forecast dispersion following the passage of FD.
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Research Article| March 01 2003
Regulation Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst Forecast Dispersion
Afshad J. Irani, Assistant Professor;
Online ISSN: 1558-7975
Print ISSN: 0888-7993
American Accounting Association
Accounting Horizons (2003) 17 (1): 15–29.
Afshad J. Irani, Irene Karamanou; Regulation Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst Forecast Dispersion. Accounting Horizons 1 March 2003; 17 (1): 15–29. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.2003.17.1.15
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